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Choices not only reflect our preference, but they also affect our behavior. The phenome-
non of choice-induced preference change has been of interest to cognitive dissonance
researchers in social psychology, and more recently, it has attracted the attention of
researchers in economics and neuroscience. Preference modulation after the mere act of
making a choice has been repeatedly demonstrated over the last 50 years by an experimen-
tal paradigm called the “free-choice paradigm.” However, Chen and Risen (2010) pointed
out a serious methodological flaw in this paradigm, arguing that evidence for choice-induced
preference change is still insufficient. Despite the flaw, studies using the traditional free-
choice paradigm continue to be published without addressing the criticism. Here, aiming
to draw more attention to this issue, we briefly explain the methodological problem, and
then describe simple simulation studies that illustrate how the free-choice paradigm pro-
duces a systematic pattern of preference change consistent with cognitive dissonance,
even without any change in true preference. Our stimulation also shows how a different
level of noise in each phase of the free-choice paradigm independently contributes to the
magnitude of artificial preference change. Furthermore, we review ways of addressing the
critique and provide a meta-analysis to show the effect size of choice-induced preference
change after addressing the critique. Finally, we review and discuss, based on the results
of the stimulation studies, how the criticism affects our interpretation of past findings
generated from the free-choice paradigm. We conclude that the use of the conventional
free-choice paradigm should be avoided in future research and the validity of past findings
from studies using this paradigm should be empirically re-established.
Keywords: preference change, attitude change, free-choice paradigm, cognitive dissonance, choice justification,
self-perception theory, cognitive consistency, social influence
INTRODUCTION
Individuals not only behave according to their preference (e.g., “I
choose it because I like it”), but their choice behavior also affects
their preference (e.g., I like it because I chose it). This process
of choice-induced preference change is traditionally explained by
cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; or by self-perception
theory, see Bem, 1967). When there is inconsistency between
preference and behavior (i.e., choosing something I don’t like),
it causes an uncomfortable feeling called “cognitive dissonance,”
which in turn motivates a person to modulate his preference in
order to restore the consistency. Over the last six decades, prefer-
ence/attitude change following the mere act of making a choice
has been repeatedly demonstrated through the free-choice para-
digm (Brehm, 1956). In this paradigm, participants are first asked
to rate (or rank) several items (e.g., music albums, posters, foods,
political candidates, jobs, etc.) according to their preference (first
rating task). Second, they are asked to choose between two of the
items that had similar preference ratings in the first rating task
(choice task). Finally, they are asked to rate their preference for
the same items one more time (second rating task). Studies found
that after making a difficult choice between two equally preferred
items, participants’ preference for the chosen item increases while
preference for the rejected item decreases (i.e., so-called“spreading
of alternative”; e.g., Brehm, 1956; Gerard and White, 1983; Steele
et al., 1993; Heine and Lehman, 1997).
Because the phenomenon of choice-induced preference modu-
lation challenges a vital assumption in neoclassical economics that
people’s behavior is determined by preference, it has attracted the
attention of researchers from various disciplines including psy-
chology, economics, and neuroscience (Ariely and Norton, 2008;
Leotti et al., 2010). Studies using the free-choice paradigm, have
involved healthy adult humans as well as amnesia patients (Lieber-
man et al., 2001),4-year-old children and capuchin monkeys (Egan
et al., 2007, 2010). More recently, the brain mechanisms underly-
ing choice-induced preference modulation have been extensively
studied with the same paradigm (Sharot et al., 2009, 2010a; Izuma
et al., 2010; Jarcho et al., 2011; Qin et al., 2011; Kitayama et al.,
2013).
In 2010, however, more than a half century after the orig-
inal study by Brehm (1956), Chen and Risen pointed out an
important methodological problem in the free-choice paradigm,
and they argued that all findings from the studies using the
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free-choice paradigm are inconclusive (Chen and Risen, 2010; see
also Risen and Chen, 2010). The original paper describing the
methodological flaw was made available to the public as a working
paper in 2008 and attracted the attention of researchers (see Chen
and Risen, 2009; Sagarin and Skowronski, 2009a,b). However,
despite the fact that their critique could potentially undermine
the conclusions of any study that uses the paradigm, behavioral,
and neuroimaging studies using the paradigm continue to be pub-
lished without addressing the critique (Sharot et al., 2009, 2010a;
Coppin et al., 2010, 2012; Imada and Kitayama, 2010; Lee and
Schwarz, 2010; West et al., 2010; Harmon-Jones et al., 2011; Jar-
cho et al., 2011; Qin et al., 2011; Kimel et al., 2012; Kitayama
et al., 2013). Furthermore, although some researchers have already
provided evidence for the existence of choice-included preference
change using new paradigms or modifications of the free-choice
paradigm, some of them are not sufficiently compelling, as detailed
later.
In this article, we first briefly describe the methodological flaw
raised by Chen and Risen (2010). Second, in order to help readers
intuitively understand the problem, we report stimulation studies
that highlight how the free-choice paradigm measures ostensible
preference change without any change in true preference. Fur-
thermore, our stimulation study also shows how noise levels in
each phase of the free-choice paradigm independently affect the
artificial spreading of alternatives. These simulation studies pro-
vide important background knowledge to help evaluate why some
methods are better than others in addressing the critique and
why some past findings are more vulnerable to the critique than
others. Third, based on the results of the stimulation studies, we
review and discuss ways of addressing the problem as done in some
recent studies. We also conducted a meta-analysis to examine how
the criticism affects the effect size of choice-induced preference
change. Finally, we review how detrimental this criticism could
be to specific findings from past studies that used the free-choice
paradigm.
THE METHODOLOGICAL FLAW IN THE FREE-CHOICE
PARADIGM
The main claim of Chen and Risen is that the original free-choice
paradigm could produce predicted preference change (“spreading
of alternatives”) even without any change in true preference (that
is, without any experience of cognitive dissonance) because the
participants’ choice during the choice task has additional informa-
tion about their preference, which can bias measured preference
change (Chen and Risen, 2010).
Suppose a person rates 50 items according to his/her preference
(first rating task), and then rates the same items again an hour later
(second rating task). If we randomly pick two items (item A and
item B in Figure 1) from a subset of items that had the same prefer-
ence rating in the first rating task, the probability that the person’s
preference for A is higher than B in the second rating task is the
same as the probability that B is higher than A (see Figure 1 case 1).
Because the preference rating, just like any other subjective rating,
is susceptible to noise, the preference for each item varies randomly
between the two rating sessions. Therefore, we cannot predict
whether one’s preference will go up or down for any given item.
FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of the methodological flaw in the
free-choice paradigm. Each object in the box represents an item (e.g.,
music CD). If two items (A and B) were randomly selected from the set,
and a participant made no choice (Case 1), the only information available
about participant’s preference for items A and B is that both had the same
ratings in the first rating task, and thus we cannot predict which item would
be rated higher during the second rating task. In contrast (Case 2), the
participant’s choice provides additional information about his/her relative
preference between the two items. Thus, if a participant selected B over A,
item B (chosen item) is likely to be rated higher than item A (rejected item)
during the second rating task (i.e., a spread of alternatives is more likely to
be observed).
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However, what if we know that a person had a choice between
A and B, and he/she picked B over A? We would then be able to
infer that the person’s true preference is at least slightly higher
for B than for A, even though the ratings were equal during the
first rating task. Then, knowing that this person slightly prefers B
over A, it seems more likely that in the second rating task, his/her
preference rating for B will be higher than that for A (Figure 1
case 2). Thus, if we had additional information about one’s true
preference, as revealed by his/her direct choice between A and
B, we could predict whether his/her preference rating is more
likely to increase or decrease for each item in a second rating
task.
This is the basis of the original free-choice experiment. Two
items that had similar preference ratings in the first rating ses-
sion are categorized as “chosen” or “rejected” items based on
the participant’s choice between them. Then, in the second rat-
ing task, preference for a chosen item is more likely to increase
than decrease, and preference for a rejected item is more likely
to decrease than increase. In other words, in the free-choice par-
adigm, researchers do not randomly categorize items into two
categories and compare them to test the effect of choice on prefer-
ence. Instead, based on the information provided by participants’
choices, they systematically categorize items into those whose rat-
ing is likely to increase (chosen items) and those whose rating
is likely to decrease (rejected items; i.e., choice and true pref-
erence is confounded). Thus, the free-choice paradigm could
be measuring systematic preference change (i.e., spreading of
alternatives) even in the complete absence of a change in true
preference.
According to Chen and Risen (2010), the argument above is
based on three assumptions, all of which seem to be uncontro-
versial: (1) ratings provide a statistically unbiased measure of a
participant’s feelings about that item, (2) participants’ choices
are at least partially guided by their preferences, and (3) par-
ticipants’ ratings are not a perfect measure of their preferences.
Chen and Risen (2010) also provided more formal mathematical
proof of how the free-choice paradigm could produce systematic
preference change in the absence of cognitive dissonance if the
three assumptions were met (see Chen and Risen, 2010 for more
details).
It should be noted that in the free-choice paradigm, preference
change after a difficult choice between two items with similar pref-
erence was typically compared with preference change after an easy
choice between one liked and one disliked item. Studies typically
show a spreading of alternatives that is larger after a difficult choice
compared to an easy choice, which is consistent with the prediction
by cognitive dissonance theory (during easy choices, participants
usually choose a liked item and reject a disliked item, both of which
are cognitively consistent, and thus less cognitive dissonance and
less preference change are expected). However, this is also what
is expected by the methodological artifact because easy choices
provide much less “additional” information about a participant’s
true preference compared to difficult choices (see Chen and Risen,
2010). Based on the first rating, we are fairly certain which item in
an easy choice pair is truly preferred, and therefore the spread of
alternatives is not as heavily influenced by the information revealed
by choice in the easy choice condition.
A SIMULATION DEMONSTRATING HOW PREFERENCE
CHANGE IS PRODUCED WITHOUT ANY CHANGE IN TRUE
PREFERENCE
To illustrate the problem more concretely, we conducted a com-
puter simulation to mimic a typical free-choice study (for details,
see Appendix). One advantage of conducting a simulation is
that we can monitor the true preference score (which cannot be
observed in a real study) for each item throughout the hypothetical
experiment. This helps us understand why the paradigm produces
a positive spreading of alternatives without a change in true pref-
erence. Let us explain how the artifact is produced in a typical
free-choice paradigm by following the simulation step by step.
In the simulation, hypothetical participants rated a set of items
(first rating), then chose items among pairs (choice), and finally
rated the items again (second rating). Each item was assigned a
“true preference score.” Importantly, we assumed that true pref-
erence remains stable across the three phases, and therefore the
spreading of alternatives found in our simulation study can never
be attributed to the effect of choice or cognitive dissonance on
true preference. In the first rating phase, we added random noise
to the true preference score to generate a “temporal preference”
score and paired the items that are closely matched. That is, we
paired the items that receive the same ratings on a 10-point scale
(1= don’t like it at all; 10= like it very much; see Figure 2, top).
The important observation from Figure 2 is that, although each
item in a pair received identical attractiveness ratings (reported
preference), their true preference is different (i.e., the true pref-
erence for item B is higher than the true preference for item A).
Because of the random noise, some item pairs could show sub-
stantial within-pair differences in the true preference scores. This
difference is the key factor that produces the spurious dissonance
effect identified by Chen and Risen (2010).
In the choice task, our simulation assumed that participants
are more likely to choose the item with a higher true preference
score (the second assumption by Chen and Risen, 2010). That is,
in the current example, item B is more likely to be chosen than
item A (see Figure 2, middle). With this assumption, although
choice involves some noise and therefore choice is probabilistic
(i.e., there are some cases where items with lower true preference
are chosen), on average, chosen items have higher true preference
scores than rejected items. In other words, choice based on indi-
vidual preference inevitably provides some information about the
underlying true preference (i.e., information revealed by choice;
Chen and Risen, 2010).
In the second rating task, we again added random noise to the
true preference score to generate a temporal preference score for
both chosen and rejected items (Figure 2, bottom). At this point,
because chosen items have higher true preference than rejected
items, the chosen items are more likely to receive higher attrac-
tiveness ratings than the rejected items (Figure 2, bottom). That
is, even if there is no choice-induced preference change, the typical
free-choice paradigm produces an artificial spread of alternatives
in the second rating task.
This hypothetical experiment (80 items, N = 10) was repeated
10,000 times, and the averaged results are plotted in Figure 3A. The
results clearly showed that chosen items are rated as more attractive
than rejected items in the second rating task. We also simulated a
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic illustration of how the free-choice paradigm
produces artificial spreading of alternatives in the simulation study.
Each normal curve represents the distribution of participant’s preference
(true preference+ random noise) for item A (blue) and B (red). In our
simulation study, participants’ temporal preference for each item was
randomly drawn from each distribution, and these numbers are rounded to
the nearest integer that represents participants’ reported preference for
each item. In this example, reported preferences for both items are 7
(A1=B1=7). When a participant is asked to make a choice between A and
B in the choice task, B is more likely to be chosen because true preference
for B is higher than that for A. Then, when participants’ temporal preference
for each item was randomly drawn for the second time from the same
distribution (preference rating task 2), temporal preference for A2 (rejected
item) is likely to decrease, while temporal preference for B2 (chosen item)
is likely to increase purely by chance. Accordingly, reported preference for A
is also likely to increase, while reported preference for B is likely to
decrease (A2=6, B2=8 in this example). Note that distributions for each
item A and B stay the same across two preference rating tasks, indicating
that there is no change in participants’ true preference.
difficult choice between two equally unattractive items (Figure 3B)
and an easy choice between one attractive item and one unattrac-
tive item (Figure 3C). Consistent with Chen and Risen (2010),
easy choice pairs did not produce a noticeable spread of alterna-
tives (Figure 3C). Unattractive pairs produced a similar spread
of alternatives as did attractive pairs (Figure 3B). Thus, the more
difficult the choice, the larger the spreading of alternatives pro-
duced by the artifact. An interesting observation is that, when
choices are made between two attractive items, the spread of alter-
natives is largely driven by the decreased preference for the rejected
items (Figure 3A), whereas when choices are made between two
unattractive items, the spread of alternatives is largely driven by
the increased preference for the chosen items (Figure 3B).
This pattern of preference change is what the cognitive dis-
sonance theory predicts because choosing an attractive item and
rejecting an unattractive item are both more cognitively consistent
and thus induce much less cognitive dissonance (and less pref-
erence change) than choosing an unattractive item or rejecting
an attractive item. In other words, our simulation showed that
the pattern of ostensible preference change produced by the
artifact exactly matches the pattern predicted by cognitive dis-
sonance theory (Festinger, 1957), highlighting how deep-rooted
this problem is in cognitive dissonance research with the free-
choice paradigm. In fact, this pattern is also largely consistent with
most of past empirical findings (e.g., Brehm, 1956; Vroom, 1966;
Gerard and White, 1983; Shultz et al., 1999; Harmon-Jones and
Harmon-Jones, 2002).
Note that there are two major parameters that influence the
spurious dissonance effect. The first parameter is the magnitude of
the random noise in the two rating phases. This parameter has two
opposing effects. Random noise in the first rating task expands the
difference in true preference within matched pairs presented in the
choice phase. Accordingly, larger random noise increases the dif-
ference between the chosen and rejected items (i.e., the larger the
random noise in the first rating, the larger the spreading of alter-
natives). On the other hand, random noise in the second rating
task works to mask the difference in the true preference inherent
in chosen and rejected items (i.e., the larger the random noise in
the second rating, the smaller the spreading of alternatives). As a
result, the magnitude of the random noise in rating is expected to
have an inverted-U shaped effect on the spreading of alternatives
(i.e., extremely small or large random noise reduces the spreading
of alternatives by the artifact). The second parameter is the mag-
nitude of the random noise in the choice phase. This parameter
basically reduces the difference between chosen and rejected items,
as true preference would have less influence on choice with larger
random noise (Chen and Risen, 2009; Sagarin and Skowronski,
2009a).
To quantify the effects of these parameters, we conducted
another simulation that independently manipulated the magni-
tude of each random noise. Figure 4 shows the spreading of
alternatives as a function of each random noise. As expected, ran-
dom noise in the rating phase had a curve linear effect, whereas
random noise in choice had a negative monotonic effect on the
spreading of alternatives. This result specifies a boundary condi-
tion on the extent to which the criticism made by Chen and Risen
(2010) is consequential. It should be noted that our simulation
employed a subjective rating as a measure of preference, but it can
be easily generalized to other experimental situations. For exam-
ple, several previous studies used a ranking paradigm in which
participants rank items according to their preference (e.g., Gerard
and White, 1983; Lieberman et al., 2001; Kitayama et al., 2004;
Lee and Schwarz, 2010). Assuming that ranking is (at least partly)
guided by true preference, such a ranking paradigm would also
produce the same pattern of results. For the same reason, other
measures of preference are also susceptible to the artifact (affec-
tive priming task: Gawronski et al., 2007; brain activations: Sharot
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FIGURE 3 | Simulated patterns of preference change across different
choice conditions (replication= 10,000). In this simulation, noise in both the
rating and choice phase was set at 0.5 (relative magnitude in comparison to
the standard deviation of the true preference; see also Figure 4). (A)
Preference change after difficult choices between two attractive items of the
same self-report preference. (B) Preference change after difficult choice
between two unattractive items of the same self-report preference. (C)
Preference change after easy choice between one attractive item and one
unattractive item (self-report preferences differs more than two points in the
10-point scale). Error bars depict the SEM.
FIGURE 4 | Simulated magnitude of spreading of alternatives by the
artifact as a function of noise in the two rating and choice phases
(replication=10,000). Spreading of alternatives is computed as (second
rating for a chosen item – first rating for a chosen item) – (second rating for
a rejected item – first rating for a rejected item). Noise is represented as
the relative magnitude in comparison to the standard deviation of the true
preference (i.e., SD=2).
et al., 2009; Sharot et al., 2010a). In addition, the basic findings
would not be influenced by other factors such as coarseness of
rating scale (e.g., whether a 5-point or a 100-point scale was used;
see Appendix) or number of items presented, as these factors are
essentially irrelevant to the information revealed by choice.
HOW CAN THE PROBLEM BE ADDRESSED?
After Chen and Risen’s (2010) critique spread among the scien-
tific community, researchers began to seek new methodologies
to address the problem. So far, three main methods have been
proposed1 (see also Risen and Chen, 2010). (1) Set up a choice
1There is another study reporting evidence for choice-induced preference change,
which is yet to be published in a peer-reviewed journal (see Johansson et al., 2012).
task so that participants’ choices do not reflect their preference
(blind choice paradigm; Egan et al., 2010; Sharot et al., 2010b),
(2) measure the degree of preference change caused purely by the
artifact and subtract it from preference change observed in the
typical free-choice paradigm (rate-rate-choose paradigm; Chen
and Risen, 2010; Izuma et al., 2010; Sharot et al., 2012), and (3)
measure preference changes for two items that are not compared
in a direct choice between them, but rather through other com-
parisons (implicit choice paradigm; Alós-Ferrer et al., 2012). Here,
we review studies using each of these methods and how successful
each method is in addressing the problem. We also run a meta-
analysis to see the effect size of choice-induced preference change
after the criticism is properly addressed.
BLIND CHOICE PARADIGM
Egan et al.’s (2010) tried to demonstrate whether 4-year-old
children and capuchin monkeys show choice-induced preference
change by fixing the methodological flaw in their original study
(Egan et al., 2007). In their new paradigm (Egan et al., 2010), they
had children blindly make a choice (Experiment 1; i.e., making
choice without knowing objects’ identities. This method was first
suggested by Sagarin and Skowronski (2009a)) or gave monkeys
an illusion of choice (Experiment 2; although monkeys felt that
they themselves selected an object, in reality the object had been
This study dissociated preference from choice by using a choice blindness paradigm
(Johansson et al., 2005). In this paradigm, by using a magic trick, participants were
led to believe that they chose an item that they had preferred less than the alterna-
tive (Johansson et al., 2012; see Henkel and Mather, 2007 for a conceptually similar
manipulation and how beliefs about a past choice leads to memory modulation).
This paradigm is similar to the blind choice paradigm used in Egan et al. (2010) and
Sharot et al. (2010b) in the sense that participants’ choice no longer reflects their
preference (in fact, this paradigm could be more conservative because the infor-
mation revealed by choice biases preference change in the opposite direction. The
item a participant thought he had selected is the one they actually preferred less,
and thus the rating for the item is more likely to decrease rather than increase). One
potentially important difference is that Johansson et al.’s choice blindness paradigm
is likely to induce more cognitive dissonance because unlike the blind choice para-
digm, participants think that their choice completely depended on their preference.
Although this study is yet to be published, and its details are not yet available, it
seems promising and the effect seems to be large (Johansson et al., 2012).
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randomly assigned by the experimenter). The point here is that
in both cases, the choice did not reflect the children’s or monkeys’
preference so that Chen and Risen’s (2010) second assumption no
longer holds. As suggested in our simulation study (see Figure 4),
if choice did not reflect participant’s preference (e.g., large noise in
the choice phase), the paradigm does not produce artificial spread-
ing of alternatives so that the pure effect of choice (dissonance)
on preference can be tested (Sagarin and Skowronski, 2009a). It
should be noted, however, that although these are elegant ways
to address the critique, their study itself (i.e., Egan et al., 2010)
has other shortcomings, which make it difficult to interpret their
findings (see Risen and Chen, 2010). Specifically, in Egan et al.
(2010) first experiment, in order to measure how children’s pref-
erence changed after the blind choice, they had children make
another blind choice. Unfortunately, this cannot be a good mea-
sure of preference because as stated above, blind choice does not
reflect preference. Furthermore, in their second experiment with
capuchin monkeys, monkeys’ preference after illusory choice was
measured by having them make 10 (non-blind) choices. However,
if choice could modulate preference, it is very likely that preference
can be modulated dynamically during these 10 choices, and pref-
erence for each object can never be correctly measured (see Risen
and Chen, 2010 for more details, see also Holden, 2013). Therefore,
although each of their new manipulations of choice (blind choice
and an illusion of choice) adequately addresses the problem, the
findings are not sufficiently compelling.
A similar blind choice method was used by Sharot et al. (2010b).
In this study, during the choice task, participants were presented
with two items (vacation destinations) only very briefly (2 ms).
Furthermore, the stimuli presented during this 2 ms were actu-
ally nonsense strings of letters. Therefore, participants’ choices
during this blind choice task never reflected their preference, and
choices could never provide any information about participants’
preference. Interestingly, the study found that participants’ pref-
erence for stimuli they thought they had selected during the blind
choice task significantly increased while no preference change was
observed in the control condition where a computer randomly
made the choices (Sharot et al., 2010b).
RATE-RATE-CHOOSE PARADIGM
The second strategy was proposed in Chen and Risen’s (2010)
original paper, and they included a new control condition that
is influenced by the artifact but not by the choice-induced pref-
erence change. The idea here is that changes in true preference
can be tested by comparing preference changes in the typical
free-choice paradigm with preference changes produced only by
the artifact. Whereas in the typical paradigm, participants per-
formed the first rating task, the choice task, and then the second
rating task (Rate-Choose-Rate order), in their new control con-
dition, participants performed the choice task after two rating
tasks (i.e., Rate-Rate-Choose order)2. In this Rate-Rate-Choose
2The Rate-Rate-Choose condition was used as a control condition previously (Shultz
et al., 1999). However, unlike our simulation study and three studies with the same
control conditions (Chen and Risen, 2010; Izuma et al., 2010; Sharot et al., 2012),
they did not find any spreading of alternatives in this control condition (Shultz et al.,
1999).
condition, any preference change between the two rating tasks
can never be attributed to the effect of making a choice (or cog-
nitive dissonance). On the other hand, the choice task still can
provide information about the participants’ true preference even
if the task is performed at the end, and thus it could predict
preference change. Supporting their argument, they first found
that the Rate-Rate-Choose condition could measure predicted
spreading of alternatives (Chen and Risen, 2010), thus exper-
imentally demonstrating that the free-choice paradigm could
measure spreading of alternatives even if the participants’ true
preferences remain completely stable. Because preference change
measured in the Rate-Rate-Choose condition reflects preference
change explained only by the artifact, the existence of choice-
induced preference change could be tested by comparing the
Rate-Choose-Rate vs. Rate-Rate-Choose conditions. Their first
study failed to find any evidence of choice-induced preference
change above and beyond the artifact. However, after modify-
ing the experimental procedure so that more dissonance was
thought to be induced (i.e., making choice more important
and meaningful), they found a marginally significant difference
between preference change in the Rate-Choose-Rate condition
and that in the Rate-Rate-Choose condition (p= 0.06; Chen
and Risen, 2010), suggesting that the mere act of making a
choice seems to have an effect on preference over and above the
artifact.
Similarly, Izuma et al. (2010) conducted a functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) study in which the criticism was
addressed by employing the Rate-Rate-Choose condition as sug-
gested by Chen and Risen (2010). The study found that preference
change in the Rate-Choose-Rate condition (self-difficult condi-
tion in the original paper) was significantly larger than that in
the Rate-Rate-Choose condition (post-ex choice condition; Izuma
et al., 2010). Furthermore, basically the same pattern of preference
change was observed in the activity of the reward-related brain
area (i.e., ventral striatum; Izuma et al., 2010), thus providing
equivocal evidence for the existence of choice-induced preference
change. Making choices affects not only self-report preference but
also its neural representation.
More recently, using the Rate-Rate-Choose condition as a con-
trol condition, Sharot et al. (2012) measured preference change
immediately after participants made choices, as well as 3 years
later, to test the duration of choice-induced preference change.
In order to control the effect of the artifact on long-lasting pref-
erence change, they asked participants to perform the choice task
on the first day (Rate-Choose-Rate condition) as well as 3 years
later, after the second rating task (Rate-Rate-Choose condition).
Although the study addresses the criticism to some extent, we have
two concerns. First, the timing of the choice tasks of two conditions
was quite different (the choice in the Rate-Rate-Choose condi-
tion was made 3 years after the first session). Thus, it is unclear
whether the level of noise is the same between two choice tasks,
which makes it difficult to interpret the difference between the
Rate-Choose-Rate and Rate-Rate-Choose conditions (see Figure 4
for how a different level of noise in the choice task affects the
magnitude of preference change by the artifact). Because it is
unclear how a 3-year interval affects the level of noise in the
rating and choice phases, the Rate-Rate-Choose condition would
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not be a good control condition, especially for testing the long-
term effect of choice on preference. Second, while there was a
significant difference between the Rate-Choose-Rate and the Rate-
Rate-Choose conditions in the first session (immediate preference
change), a significant difference between these two conditions
was not reported in the second session (long-lasting preference
change).
IMPLICIT CHOICE PARADIGM
The third strategy (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2012) aims to demon-
strate choice-induced preference change using an implicit choice
method. In this study, participants first rated 80 items, made
choices between item pairs, and then rated all of them again. How-
ever, unlike the typical free-choice paradigm, two items with the
same reported preference (a and b) were categorized as “chosen”
or “rejected” on the basis of a choice between each of the two items
and another item, not by direct comparison (i.e., “implicit choice”
between a and b). That is, items a and item b were each paired
with another item (h or l), and participants made choices between
a and h, and b and l. Items h and l were selected from a set of items
based on the first rating; reported preference for h was higher than
a, and reported preference for l was lower than b (h> a= b> l in
the first preference rating). Therefore, participants were likely to
choose h over a, and b over l. Then, preference change between the
first and second rating were compared between the rejected item
a and the chosen item b. Importantly, if one of choices in the a-h
and b-l pairings was not as expected, the four items were excluded
from the analysis (i.e., selection bias).
Unfortunately, although the information about relative pref-
erence between a and b was never revealed by a direct choice,
we think that this method is still susceptible to the artifact to
some extent3. First, although participants did not make a direct
choice between a and b, choices between a and h, and b and l can
still reveal some information about true preference for a and b.
For example, take an extreme case in which the four items (a, b,
h, and l) have the same preference rating in the first rating task
(h= a= b= l). If participants picked h over a, and b over l, the
second preference ratings for rejected items (a and l) are likely
to decrease while ratings for chosen items (b and h) are likely to
increase. Thus, although no choice was made between a and b, we
can still predict that the second rating for b is likely to be higher
than a (i.e., spread of alternatives). Just like the differential level
of artificial spreading of alternatives for easy and difficult choice
conditions seen in our simulation (see Figure 3), the amount of
information about a participant’s true preference that choices can
reveal depends on how close the first preference ratings for each
item in a pair (a-h or b-l pair) were (i.e., how difficult the choice
is). The closer the reported preferences between a and h, and b
and l, the more additional information choices can reveal, and
thus the larger the spread of alternatives by the artifact. This seems
to fit with their findings that spreading of alternatives generally
decreases as the difference (D) in reported preference between a
and h, and b and l increases, thus suggesting that the implicit
choice method is susceptible to the artifact.
3We ran a simulation study to test it and confirmed that their method of implicit
choice is also susceptible to the artifact (data not shown).
It should be noted, however, that they also conducted an addi-
tional analysis that they called a“robustness check.”In this analysis,
they included all items regardless of the participant’s actual choices
by treating them as if all of choices were as expected from the
first rating (item a as rejected and item b as chosen). Because
there is no selection bias in this case, the artifact should not
produce preference. In other words, the findings from the implicit
choice method are considered to be valid only for the results from
this robustness check analysis. Alós-Ferrer et al. (2012) revealed
significant preference change with this analysis. Thus, although
implicit choice is not an ideal method to deal with the artifact, it
nonetheless could provide evidence for choice-induced preference
change. One weakness of the robustness check analysis is that the
exact effect size of choice-induced preference change cannot be
estimated, as the analysis considers some rejected items as chosen
ones (or vice versa).
META-ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY
It is worth noting that the magnitude of the effect is substantially
smaller than that reported in previous studies when researchers
appropriately used these methodologies to address Chen and
Risen’s (2010) critique. In fact, in both Sharot et al. (2010b) and
Izuma et al. (2010), the effects are significant only with one-
tailed tests (i.e., 0.05< two-tailed p-values< 0.10). The behav-
ioral experiments conducted by Chen and Risen (2010) exhibited
non-significant and marginally significant effects. To quantify the
magnitude of the choice-induced preference change, we meta-
analyzed the effect sizes of these studies.4 Izuma et al. (2010)
and Sharot et al. (2010b) utilized a matched-group experimental
design, comparing the spreading of alternatives of an experi-
mental condition with that of an appropriate control condition
(i.e., blind choice or Rate-Rate-Choose condition; see the pre-
vious section). In this case, we would need correlation between
spreading of alternatives of the experimental condition and those
of the control condition to estimate effect size (Dunlap et al.,
1996). This information is not available from Sharot et al. (2010b).
Accordingly, we used the correlation coefficient obtained from
Izuma et al. (2010) to compute the effect size of Sharot et al.
(2010b). The effect sizes for these studies did not significantly
vary across the studies, Q(3)= 0.618, p= 0.89. Importantly, the
integrated effect size is statistically significant, but small in magni-
tude based on the conventional criterion (Cohen, 1988), d = 0.26,
95% CI= (0.10, 0.42). This effect size is also substantially smaller
than that reported in the recent meta-analysis, d = 0.61, 95%
CI= (0.55, 0.66; Kenworthy et al., 2011; see Figure 5). These
findings indicate that choice-induced preference change does
exist, but past studies substantially overestimated the effect due
to the methodological artifact pointed out by Chen and Risen
(2010).
So far there are three ways of addressing the criticism, and each
has produced evidence that choice-induced preference change
truly exists. However, the effect size is considerably smaller than
what had been previously shown. It is also important to note
that not all studies using these methods provided sufficient
4Alós-Ferrer et al. (2012) was not included in the meta-analysis because the exact
effect size cannot be known from their robustness check analysis.
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FIGURE 5 | Forest plot that compares the averaged effect size reported in a previous meta-analysis (Kenworthy et al., 2011; k =18) and that reported
in the studies addressing Chen and Risen’s (2010) criticism (k =4).
evidence. As stated above, the Rate-Rate-Choose condition is
probably not a good way to control the effect of information
revealed by choice especially when testing for long-lasting pref-
erence change. Furthermore, although Alós-Ferrer et al. (2012)
tried to address the problem, their implicit choice paradigm seems
to be susceptible to the artifact as well, illustrating how com-
plicated the problem is. There could be other good methods
of tackling the problem, but researchers should carefully exam-
ine the validity of a new paradigm before conducting a study.
We hope that the results of our simulation study (see Appendix
for details) will help researchers judge the validity of their own
method, and perhaps encourage them to run their own simu-
lation to test the validity of a new paradigm before conducting
experiments.
HOW DOES THE PROBLEM AFFECT PAST FINDINGS?
HOW SERIOUS IS THE PROBLEM?
It is important to note that Chen and Risen’s (2010) argument says
nothing about whether choice-induced preference change is real
or not. Rather, their claim is that the preference change measure
in the typical free-choice paradigm is confounded with an artifact
for any particular study. As our brief review and meta-analysis
indicate, choice-induced preference change has been observed
after properly addressing the criticism by Chen and Risen (2010).
These findings suggest that choice-induced preference change does
exist, at least under certain conditions. However, this does not
mean that the criticism was invalid or unimportant. Three stud-
ies (Chen and Risen, 2010; Izuma et al., 2010; Sharot et al., 2012)
demonstrated that the free-choice paradigm could measure sig-
nificant preference change without any change in true preference
(i.e., significant preference change in the Rate-Rate-Choose con-
dition), which indicates that the confounding effect is serious and
non-negligible. In fact, our meta-analysis shows that the effect
size for choice-induced preference change is considerably smaller
than what was previously shown. In addition, our simulation
indicated that the degree of confounding varies depending on
several factors that are specific to individual experiments (see also
Sagarin and Skowronski, 2009a). Therefore, the fact that some
well-crafted studies (e.g., Chen and Risen, 2010; Izuma et al.,
2010; Sharot et al., 2010b; Alós-Ferrer et al., 2012; Johansson et al.,
2012) provided evidence for choice-induced preference change
does not mean that other studies are immune to the confounding
issue. The confounding of the artifact must be taken into account
in future studies of choice-induced preference change, and the
results from past studies that did not address the issue must be
re-established.
Therefore, at least some of results of past studies using the
traditional free-choice paradigm are in question. In addition to
the original study by Brehm (1956), investigations of the detailed
pattern of choice-induced preference change (Greenwald, 1969;
Gerard and White, 1983; Shultz et al., 1999) and studies that
simply aimed to demonstrate choice-induced preference change
using different attitude objects such as jobs (Vroom, 1966; Lawler
et al., 1975) or olfactory stimuli (Coppin et al., 2010, 2012) are
the most vulnerable to the criticism.5 Similarly, as stated above,
the same criticism applies to studies using a different measure of
preference, such as implicit association between a target item and
positive/negative words (Gawronski et al., 2007) or brain activa-
tions (Sharot et al., 2009, 2010a). In what follows, we will briefly
review how the criticism affects other findings.
STUDIES INVESTIGATING THE EFFECT OF MEMORY ABOUT PAST
CHOICES
The effect of explicit memory about past choice has been inves-
tigated by comparing normal control participants with amnesic
patients (Study 1 in Lieberman et al., 2001) or by measuring partic-
ipants’ memory about their previous choices (Coppin et al., 2010,
2012). However, as the Rate-Rate-Choose condition could produce
5Coppin et al. (2012) conducted three experiments to test the role of explicit mem-
ory for previous choices in preference change. In two of their experiments, they used
a typical free-choice paradigm (i.e., the effect of information revealed by choices was
not controlled), and in the final experiment, they used a version of the paradigm
called “effort justification” to which Chen and Risen’s criticism does not apply. They
found significant results in each of the three experiments and argued that because
they found a similar effect in the paradigm where Chen and Risen’s criticism does
not apply (third experiment), the results obtained in the first and second exper-
iment are more than a mere artifact of the free-choice paradigm (Coppin et al.,
2012). However, this is not true. The third experiment is completely independent
from the first two experiments, and their results in the first and second experiments
are simply inconclusive (the results are possible even without any change in true
preference), as the experiments did not address the methodological problem.
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a significant artificial preference change (Chen and Risen, 2010;
Izuma et al., 2010; Sharot et al., 2012), the original free-choice para-
digm could measure ostensible preference change without explicit
memory of choices simply due to the artifact (i.e., in the Rate-
Rate-Choose condition, participants had absolutely no memory
of their choices during the second rating task simply because they
had not made any choices yet). Thus, preference changes reported
in all of these studies are possible even without any change in true
preference following choice.
STUDIES INVESTIGATING THE EFFECT OF OTHER MODERATING
FACTORS
Using the free-choice paradigm, many social psychological stud-
ies have investigated the effect of moderating factors on choice-
induced preference change as a measure of dissonance reduction.
The studies typically compare preference changes between two or
more conditions with different experimental manipulations (e.g.,
choice importance, choice reversibility, etc.; e.g., Brehm, 1956;
Brehm and Cohen, 1959; Deutsch et al., 1962; Brock, 1963; Wal-
ster et al., 1967; Greenwald, 1969; Brehm and Jones, 1970; Brehm
and Wicklund, 1970; Gordon and Glass, 1970; Walster and Wal-
ster, 1970; Converse and Cooper, 1979; Olson and Zanna, 1979,
1982; Gerard and White, 1983; Frey et al., 1984; Steele et al.,
1993; Heine and Lehman, 1997; Lyubomirsky and Ross, 1999;
Lieberman et al., 2001; Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2002;
Kitayama et al., 2004; Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005; Harmon-
Jones et al., 2008; Imada and Kitayama, 2010; Lee and Schwarz,
2010). In these studies, results on relative difference in prefer-
ence change between experimental conditions might be valid
as the level of noise (and thus preference change explained by
the artifact) should be no different across conditions as long
as participants were randomly assigned into each experimental
condition. However, without a proper control condition, any argu-
ment about absolute preference change would not be warranted
(i.e., it is unclear whether or not significant dissonance reduction
occurred in each condition). Furthermore, as discussed in the orig-
inal critique (Chen and Risen, 2010), it remains possible that the
moderating factors of interest may have affected the magnitude of
noise in the rating and/or choice phases rather than a psycholog-
ical process. This, in turn, could have produced the difference in
the magnitude of spreading of alternatives across conditions (see
Figure 4).
The same argument applies to past studies comparing pref-
erence change between two groups of individuals with different
personalities (e.g., Gordon and Glass, 1970; Olson and Zanna,
1979, 1982; Steele et al., 1993; Lyubomirsky and Ross, 1999) or
different cultural backgrounds (e.g., Heine and Lehman, 1997;
Kitayama et al., 2004; Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005; Imada and
Kitayama, 2010). Thus, although we believe that there is a fair
chance that past findings of effects of different moderating vari-
ables hold, we cannot be sure without data, and the replication
of these studies with a proper paradigm (e.g., blind choice or
Rate-Rate-Choose paradigm) would be necessary.
NEUROIMAGING STUDIES USING THE PARADIGM
Three fMRI studies previously investigated which brain regions
during the choice task (Jarcho et al., 2011; Kitayama et al., 2013) or
the second rating task (Qin et al., 2011) tracks the degree of pref-
erence change on an item-by-item basis. Our simulation study
showed that noise in the rating and choice phases alone could
produce ostensible preference change. Thus, item-by-item pref-
erence change in the typical free-choice paradigm is at best very
crude as a measure of true choice-induced preference change (or
measure of choice justification). It is therefore unclear whether
results reported in these studies (Jarcho et al., 2011; Qin et al.,
2011; Kitayama et al., 2013) hold after addressing the criticism.
Furthermore, because most neuroimaging studies (Sharot et al.,
2009, 2010a; Jarcho et al., 2011; Qin et al., 2011; Kitayama et al.,
2013) used the conventional free-choice paradigm, it remains
unclear whether significant choice-induced preference change (or
choice justification) occurred during each of these experiments.
This renders it difficult to argue that brain activations reported
in these studies are truly related to choice-induced preference
change.
STUDIES INVESTIGATING INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN THE
SPREADING OF ALTERNATIVES
Past studies have also examined across-participant correlation
between choice-induced preference change and other variables
(e.g., Gawronski et al., 2007; Harmon-Jones et al., 2011; Qin
et al., 2011). However, it is also likely that individual-level pref-
erence change does not correctly reflect how much an individual
changed their true preference following choice (or how much
an individual reduced cognitive dissonance), because individ-
ual differences in the magnitude of noise in each phase alone
should have non-negligible influence on individual differences
in reported preference change (see Figure 4). Data from Izuma
et al. (2010) suggests that individual differences in preference
changes, which are measured in the typical free-choice paradigm
explain only about 28% of the total variance in true preference
changes.6
SUMMARY
As reviewed above, the extent to which the criticism by Chen and
Risen (2010) affects the validity of past studies varies depending on
the experiment. Some findings could be explained without con-
sidering any change in true preference. In studies testing the effect
of moderating factors, relative differences in preference change
between experimental conditions may be valid, only if one can
6Preference changes measured in the conventional free-choice paradigm (PCmea-
sured) can be considered to include changes explained by the true effect of making
a choice (PCtrue) and changes explained by the artifact (PCartifact; i.e., PCmea-
sured=PCtrue+PCartifact). To see how strong preference change by the artifact
and true preference change by choice are related across individuals (association
between PCmeasured and PCtrue), we re-analyzed the behavioral data from Izuma
et al. (2010). Here, choice-induced preference change (PCtrue) is computed by tak-
ing the difference between preference changes seen in the conventional free-choice
paradigm (Rate-Choose-Rate or Self-difficult condition) vs. preference changes pro-
duced purely by the artifact (the Rate-Rate-Choose or Post-experimental choice con-
dition; i.e., PCtrue=PCmeasured−PCartifact). The correlation between PCmea-
sured and PCtrue was r(18)= 0.53 (p= 0.016). Although the correlation was statis-
tically significant, the correlation coefficient of 0.53 indicates that preference change
measured in the typical free-choice paradigm (PCmeasured) includes a consider-
able amount of noise (about 72% of the total variance) as a measure of individual
difference in choice-induced preference change (PCtrue).
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be certain that the moderating factors of interest did not affect
the noise level in the rating and/or choice phases. Although some
neuroimaging studies used item-by-item preference changes, it is
doubtful that these changes reliably reflect change in true prefer-
ence. Similarly, individual differences in preference change seem
to be noisy as a measure of change in true preference. Again, this is
not to say that all of these findings are false – our point is that it is
difficult to evaluate the validity of each of these findings without
appropriately controlling for the artifact pointed out by Chen and
Risen (2010).
Recently, Kenworthy et al. (2011) conducted a meta-analysis to
investigate whether results from different paradigms in cognitive
dissonance research reflect a common mechanism. Interestingly,
they found that a single variable (guilt) could explain effect sizes of
all paradigms (such as induced compliance, insufficient justifica-
tion, selective exposure, and disconfirmed expectancies) except
for the free-choice paradigm. This result makes sense because
effect sizes of past studies using the free-choice paradigm are con-
founded with the effect explained by the artifact, suggesting that
at least some findings in studies using the free-choice paradigm
are unreliable.
Finally, it should be noted that although a number of past stud-
ies did not address the criticism by Chen and Risen (2010) as
stated above, not all findings reported in each of these studies
are meaningless. Some of the studies included experiments using
other paradigms in cognitive dissonance research (e.g., induced
compliance) to which Chen and Risen’s (2010) criticism does not
apply. Furthermore, even when the free-choice paradigm was used,
some studies included findings that cannot be undermined by
the methodological artifact. For example, Lyubomirsky and Ross
(1999) investigated whether high school seniors’ evaluations of
colleges they had applied to change after they themselves chose or
rejected colleges and also after colleges rejected them. Although
changes in the evaluations of colleges they themselves selected or
rejected is susceptible to the artifact, the artifact does not affect
changes in the evaluation of colleges that rejected them, because
the choice was made by the college. They found that the evaluation
of colleges that rejected them decreased, especially for happy indi-
viduals compared to unhappy individuals (Lyubomirsky and Ross,
1999). While detailed reviews and evaluations of all past studies
that used the free-choice paradigm are well beyond the scope of
the present paper, each reader should carefully examine how the
criticism by Chen and Risen (2010) affects the overall conclu-
sion of each of these previous studies that used the conventional
free-choice paradigm.
CONCLUSION
Chen and Risen (2010) pointed out an important methodological
artifact in the more than 50-year-old free-choice paradigm. Our
simulated study demonstrates the validity of their criticism and
further shows how random noise in each phase of the free-choice
paradigm differentially affects the artificial spreading of alterna-
tives. In addition, three studies (Chen and Risen, 2010; Izuma et al.,
2010; Sharot et al., 2012) empirically demonstrated that the arti-
fact alone is sufficient to produce significant preference change.
Taken together, these results suggest that the use of the tradi-
tional free-choice paradigm should be avoided in future research.
Although some new studies that address the methodological flaw
have already reported that choice does affect preference, these data
do not validate all past findings. The criticism by Chen and Risen
(2010) could still potentially undermine all past research in which
the free-choice paradigm was used. Therefore, although we believe
that at least some of results reported in previous studies hold
even after addressing the problem, we agree with previous discus-
sions (Chen and Risen, 2009; Sagarin and Skowronski, 2009a,b)
and think that it is an empirical question. Thus, it is impor-
tant to re-establish the effects of several moderating factors on
the previously demonstrated process of choice-induced prefer-
ence change. As the phenomenon of choice-induced preference
change has been of great interest for psychologists, economists,
and neuroscientists, questions addressed previously should be
investigated in future research with an appropriate paradigm. Fur-
thermore, as the effect size of choice-induced preference change is
likely to be smaller than what was previously believed (see results
of our meta-analysis), avoiding the “file drawer problem” would
be important for correctly understanding this phenomenon (see
Spellman, 2012).
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APPENDIX
SIMULATION DETAILS
In the simulation, hypothetical participants (N = 10) rated a set
of 80 items on a 10-point scale (first rating; 1= don’t like it at all;
10= like it very much), then chose items among pairs (choice), and
finally rated the items again on the same 10-point scale (second
rating). For each participant, each item was assigned a “true pref-
erence score” on a continuous latent scale, which was randomly
drawn from a normal distribution with mean 5.5 and standard
deviation 2 (the mean and standard deviation were determined so
that the true preference scores are reasonably distributed between
1 and 10). We assumed that true preference remains stable across
the three phases. In the first rating phase, we added random noise
to the true preference score to generate a “temporal preference”
score and rounded that value to the nearest whole number. For
example, if the true preference score was 5.5 and random noise was
+1.1, then the observed rating was 7, rounded from a temporal
preference score of 6.6. After the first rating, item pairs were pre-
sented that had been rated as equally attractive. That is, we paired
items that received identical observed preference ratings in the 6–
8 range. Figure A1 illustrates the item pairs created in one case
of the simulation along with their true preference, random noise,
and actual ratings. Note that, although each item in a pair received
identical attractiveness ratings, their true preference is different.
In addition, because random noise is added to the true preference
score, some item pairs show substantial within-pair differences in
the true preference scores.
In the choice task, random noise is again added to the true
preference score, and we simply assumed that participants chose
the item that has the higher temporal preference in this task. This
procedure assures that participants are on average more likely to
choose the item with the higher true preference score (the second
assumption by Chen and Risen, 2010). As a result, chosen items
are more likely to have higher true preference scores than rejected
items. This point is illustrated in Figure A1B. We reordered the
chosen and rejected items taken from hypothetical pairs depicted
in Figure A1A (for illustrative purposes, we had participants sim-
ply choose the item with the higher true preference score in this
figure). As is clear from the figure, although the observed ratings
are identical between the chosen and rejected items, there is a bias
in the true preference score that favors the chosen items.
In the second rating task, independent random noise was added
again to the true preference score, and the same procedure with
the first rating task was applied to obtain the observed ratings.
Because chosen items have the higher true preference score, the
chosen items are more likely to receive higher attractiveness ratings
than the rejected items when items are rated again.
The simulation results are presented in Figure 3. In this sim-
ulation, noise in both the rating and choice phase was set at 0.5
(relative magnitude in comparison to the standard deviation of
the true preference.
EFFECTS OF SCALE COARSENESS
Scale coarseness influences the number of item pairs created for
each participant (i.e., more fine-grained scale would create less
FIGURE A1 | (A) Table including information about true preference, random
noise, temporal preference, and observed ratings. Items are paired on the
basis of observed ratings, but true preference is sometimes substantially
different between the two items in a pair. Items with the asterisk are more
likely to be chosen (i.e., they have higher true preference than their
counterparts). (B) We sorted the items based on the likely choice
suggested in (A). Although the observed preference is equivalent, the
chosen items have higher true preference than the rejected items.
item pairs that receive the same attractiveness ratings). However,
it has little impact on the magnitude of the artifact, as the dif-
ference in true preference score in an item pair is irrelevant to
whether the scale is coarse or not. To test our argument, we com-
pared simulation results that used a 10-point scale and a 50-point
scale (with 200 items; 1,000 replications). In the 10-point scale,
items that ranged from 6 to 8 are paired and in the 50-point scale,
items that ranged from 30 to 32 are paired. The other parame-
ters are identical with those used in Figure 3. When a 10-point
scale was used, the average spread of activation was 0.85. On the
other hand, when a 50-point scale was used, the average spread of
activation was 4.17. These two values are almost the same when
the latter is transformed onto a 10-point scale (i.e., when the latter
value was divided by 5). These results indicate that scale coarseness
has little impact on the artifact.
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